feat: additional roles per app

This commit is contained in:
Björn Fromme
2026-08-12 08:57:11 +02:00
parent f51d699928
commit b62abb1801
6 changed files with 152 additions and 33 deletions
+33 -10
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@@ -37,27 +37,42 @@ Register **one** confidential client for the BFF (Appsmith apps never get their
### Apps (`config/services.yaml` → `appsmith.apps`)
One entry per Appsmith app: its login-return URL and the Keycloak client role required to use it.
One entry per Appsmith app: its login-return URL, the Keycloak client role required to enter it, and the prefix marking that app's permission roles.
```yaml
appsmith.apps:
crm:
url: '%env(APP_CRM_LOGIN_URL)%'
role: 'app-crm-access'
role_prefix: 'app-crm-'
access_role: 'app-crm-access'
helpdesk:
url: '%env(APP_HELPDESK_LOGIN_URL)%'
role: 'app-helpdesk-access'
role_prefix: 'app-helpdesk-'
access_role: 'app-helpdesk-access'
```
Add the matching `APP_<KEY>_LOGIN_URL` in `.env.local`. No code changes needed.
Role setup in Keycloak:
1. On the BFF client → **Roles** → create one role per app (e.g. `app-crm-access`).
2. Create a group per app, assign the matching role under the group's **Role mapping**.
Keep prefixes non-overlapping — with `app-crm-` and `app-crm-admin-` as two apps, the first would swallow the second's roles.
### Roles and permissions
All roles live on the single BFF client. Two kinds, distinguished only by name:
- **Access role** (`access_role`) — the gate. Without it, login ends in `?error=access_denied`.
- **Permission roles** — every other role sharing the app's `role_prefix`. The prefix is stripped before the app sees them, so `app-crm-write` is reported as `write`. Adding a permission is a Keycloak role creation; nothing changes here or in the code.
Setup in Keycloak:
1. On the BFF client → **Roles** → create `app-crm-access` plus one role per permission (`app-crm-view`, `app-crm-write`, …).
2. Create a group per app (or per role bundle, e.g. `crm-editors`), assign roles under the group's **Role mapping**.
3. Put users in whichever groups they need.
4. Client → **Client scopes**`<client>-dedicated`**Mappers** → confirm a "client roles" mapper exists with **Add to access token** enabled (default for new clients).
Enforcement happens once, in `AuthController::callback`, by checking `resource_access.<client_id>.roles` on the access token right after login. The `/api/*` proxy does not re-check roles per request.
Where this is enforced: the access role is checked once, in `AuthController::callback`, against `resource_access.<client_id>.roles` on the access token right after login. The `/api/*` proxy does not re-check anything per request.
Permissions are **not** enforced by the BFF at all. `/auth/me` reports them so an app can hide or disable widgets, but anyone holding a `sid` can call the API directly. The backend is the authorization boundary and must check the roles claim on the access token the proxy injects.
Roles are re-read from Keycloak whenever the BFF refreshes the access token (roughly once per token lifetime), so granting or revoking a permission takes effect without a re-login. The access role is deliberately *not* re-checked there — revoking it takes effect at the next login, or immediately if you kill the Keycloak session.
### Backends (`config/services.yaml` → `backends`)
@@ -170,7 +185,7 @@ storeValue('sid', null);
navigateTo('LoginPage', {}, 'REPLACE');
```
**User profile** — one query `Bff_Me`: `GET /auth/me`, header `Authorization: Bearer {{appsmith.store.sid}}`. Returns:
**User profile and permissions** — one query `Bff_Me`: `GET /auth/me?app=crm`, header `Authorization: Bearer {{appsmith.store.sid}}`. The `app` key is required (hardcode the app's own key, same value it passes to `Bff.login`); one session is shared across every app the user has open, so the BFF needs to know who's asking to scope the permissions. Returns:
```json
{
@@ -179,11 +194,19 @@ navigateTo('LoginPage', {}, 'REPLACE');
"name": "Jane Doe",
"given_name": "Jane",
"family_name": "Doe",
"preferred_username": "jdoe"
"preferred_username": "jdoe",
"app": "crm",
"permissions": ["access", "view", "write"]
}
```
Reference via `{{appsmith.store.user.email}}` etc. This is client-visible display data, not an authorization signal — the backend must still authorize off the real access token the BFF injects.
Reference via `{{appsmith.store.user.email}}` etc. Gate UI on permissions with
```js
{{ appsmith.store.user.permissions.includes('write') }}
```
This is client-visible display data, not an authorization signal — the backend must still authorize off the real access token the BFF injects.
## Known limitation
+9 -3
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@@ -7,14 +7,20 @@ parameters:
keycloak.redirect_uri: '%env(KEYCLOAK_REDIRECT_URI)%'
keycloak.post_logout_redirect: '%env(KEYCLOAK_POST_LOGOUT_REDIRECT)%'
# Allowlist of Appsmith apps this BFF will redirect back to, each with
# the Keycloak client role (on the bff client) required to enter it.
# Allowlist of Appsmith apps this BFF will redirect back to. An app's
# permissions are the Keycloak roles on the bff client sharing its
# `role_prefix`; the prefix is stripped when they're reported to the app,
# so `app-sandbox-write` becomes "write". Adding a permission means
# creating the role in Keycloak — nothing to change here. `access_role`
# is the single role required to enter the app at all.
# Keep prefixes non-overlapping across apps, or roles bleed between them.
# Add one entry per app you build. Never accept a return URL from the
# request itself — always resolve through this map.
appsmith.apps:
app-sandbox:
url: '%env(APP_SANDBOX_LOGIN_URL)%'
role: 'app-sandbox-access'
role_prefix: 'app-sandbox-'
access_role: 'app-sandbox-access'
# Named backends the proxy can forward to. A request picks one via the
# X-Backend header; omitting it uses "default". Add BACKEND_<KEY>_URL to
+32 -15
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@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
namespace App\Controller;
use App\Security\AccessTokenRoles;
use App\Security\AppRegistry;
use App\Security\IdTokenDecoder;
use App\Session\BffSessionStore;
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ class AuthController extends AbstractController
private readonly BffSessionStore $store,
private readonly IdTokenDecoder $idTokenDecoder,
private readonly AppRegistry $apps,
private readonly AccessTokenRoles $tokenRoles,
private readonly string $kcBaseUrl,
private readonly string $kcRealm,
private readonly string $kcClientId,
@@ -81,7 +83,6 @@ class AuthController extends AbstractController
$appKey = (string) $session->get('oauth_app');
$returnUrl = $this->apps->resolveReturnUrl($appKey);
$requiredRole = $this->apps->requiredRole($appKey);
$response = $this->client->request(
'POST',
@@ -111,8 +112,14 @@ class AuthController extends AbstractController
// This is the only enforcement point — the proxy trusts any
// already-established session, by design, since "may this user
// use app X" is a login-time question, not a per-request one.
//
// The full role list is kept on the session so /auth/me can report
// the app's finer-grained permissions. Those are display data for
// the app's UI only; they are never re-checked per request here —
// the backend authorizes off the forwarded access token.
$accessClaims = $this->idTokenDecoder->decode($tokens['access_token']);
if (!$this->hasRole($accessClaims, $requiredRole)) {
$roles = $this->tokenRoles->extract($accessClaims);
if (!in_array($this->apps->accessRole($appKey), $roles, true)) {
$session->remove('pkce_verifier');
$session->remove('oauth_state');
$session->remove('oauth_app');
@@ -134,6 +141,7 @@ class AuthController extends AbstractController
'refresh_token' => $tokens['refresh_token'],
'id_token' => $tokens['id_token'],
'expires_at' => time() + (int) $tokens['expires_in'],
'roles' => $roles,
'profile' => [
'email' => $idClaims['email'] ?? null,
'email_verified' => $idClaims['email_verified'] ?? null,
@@ -149,19 +157,20 @@ class AuthController extends AbstractController
return new RedirectResponse($returnUrl . $separator . http_build_query(['sid' => $kcSid]));
}
/** @param array<string,mixed> $accessTokenClaims */
private function hasRole(array $accessTokenClaims, string $role): bool
{
$roles = $accessTokenClaims['resource_access'][$this->kcClientId]['roles'] ?? [];
return in_array($role, $roles, true);
}
/**
* Returns the logged-in user's profile (email, name, etc). Called by
* an app as a normal API query with `Authorization: Bearer <sid>` —
* same pattern as /api/*, but served directly by the BFF since this
* data comes from the ID token, not the backend.
* Returns the logged-in user's profile (email, name, etc) plus the
* permissions they hold for the calling app. Called by an app as a
* normal API query with `Authorization: Bearer <sid>` — same pattern as
* /api/*, but served directly by the BFF since this data comes from the
* tokens, not the backend.
*
* The `app` query parameter is required: one session is shared by every
* app the user opens, so the BFF can only scope permissions if the
* caller says which app is asking.
*
* Permissions here are for the app's own UI gating. They are not an
* authorization boundary — anything that matters must be enforced by
* the backend off the access token the proxy injects.
*/
#[Route('/auth/me', methods: ['GET'])]
public function me(Request $request): JsonResponse
@@ -171,12 +180,20 @@ class AuthController extends AbstractController
return new JsonResponse(['error' => 'unauthenticated'], 401);
}
$appKey = (string) $request->query->get('app', '');
if (!$this->apps->isValidApp($appKey)) {
return new JsonResponse(['error' => 'unknown or missing app key'], 400);
}
$session = $this->store->get($kcSid);
if ($session === null) {
return new JsonResponse(['error' => 'session expired'], 401);
}
return new JsonResponse($session['profile'] ?? []);
return new JsonResponse(($session['profile'] ?? []) + [
'app' => $appKey,
'permissions' => $this->apps->permissions($appKey, $session['roles'] ?? []),
]);
}
/**
+25
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@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
<?php
namespace App\Security;
/**
* The one place that knows where an app's roles live in a Keycloak access
* token: as client roles on the BFF's own confidential client. Both the
* login gate and the token refresh read them through here.
*/
class AccessTokenRoles
{
public function __construct(private readonly string $kcClientId)
{
}
/**
* @param array<string,mixed> $accessTokenClaims decoded (and signature-verified) access token
*
* @return list<string>
*/
public function extract(array $accessTokenClaims): array
{
return array_values($accessTokenClaims['resource_access'][$this->kcClientId]['roles'] ?? []);
}
}
+34 -5
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@@ -4,14 +4,18 @@ namespace App\Security;
/**
* Allowlist of Appsmith apps this BFF will redirect back to after login,
* each paired with the Keycloak client role required to access it.
* each paired with the Keycloak client role required to access it and the
* prefix identifying that app's permission roles.
*
* Never redirect to an arbitrary caller-supplied URL — always resolve
* through this registry to prevent open-redirect abuse.
*/
class AppRegistry
{
/** @param array<string,array{url:string,role:string}> $apps app key => ['url' => ..., 'role' => ...] */
/**
* @param array<string,array{url:string,role_prefix:string,access_role:string}> $apps
* app key => ['url' => ..., 'role_prefix' => ..., 'access_role' => ...]
*/
public function __construct(private readonly array $apps)
{
}
@@ -26,12 +30,37 @@ class AppRegistry
return $this->requireApp($appKey)['url'];
}
public function requiredRole(string $appKey): string
public function accessRole(string $appKey): string
{
return $this->requireApp($appKey)['role'];
return $this->requireApp($appKey)['access_role'];
}
/** @return array{url:string,role:string} */
/**
* Narrows every role the user holds on the bff client down to the ones
* belonging to this app, reported without the app's prefix. The access
* role shares the prefix, so it shows up here as "access" — intentional,
* the prefix has no exceptions and apps are free to ignore it.
*
* @param list<string> $clientRoles every bff-client role the user holds
*
* @return list<string> this app's permissions, prefix stripped
*/
public function permissions(string $appKey, array $clientRoles): array
{
$prefix = $this->requireApp($appKey)['role_prefix'];
$permissions = [];
foreach ($clientRoles as $role) {
if (str_starts_with($role, $prefix)) {
$permissions[] = substr($role, strlen($prefix));
}
}
sort($permissions);
return $permissions;
}
/** @return array{url:string,role_prefix:string,access_role:string} */
private function requireApp(string $appKey): array
{
if (!isset($this->apps[$appKey])) {
+19
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@@ -2,6 +2,8 @@
namespace App\Session;
use App\Security\AccessTokenRoles;
use App\Security\IdTokenDecoder;
use Psr\Log\LoggerInterface;
use Symfony\Contracts\HttpClient\HttpClientInterface;
@@ -12,6 +14,8 @@ class TokenRefresher
public function __construct(
private readonly HttpClientInterface $client,
private readonly BffSessionStore $store,
private readonly IdTokenDecoder $idTokenDecoder,
private readonly AccessTokenRoles $tokenRoles,
private readonly LoggerInterface $logger,
private readonly string $kcBaseUrl,
private readonly string $kcRealm,
@@ -64,6 +68,21 @@ class TokenRefresher
$session['refresh_token'] = $tokens['refresh_token'] ?? $session['refresh_token'];
$session['expires_at'] = time() + $tokens['expires_in'];
// Re-read the roles so /auth/me reflects permissions granted or
// revoked in Keycloak mid-session. The access gate itself is not
// re-evaluated here — "may this user use app X" stays a login-time
// question, so losing the access role won't kill a live session.
try {
$session['roles'] = $this->tokenRoles->extract(
$this->idTokenDecoder->decode($tokens['access_token'])
);
} catch (\Throwable $e) {
// Keep the previous list — a decode hiccup must not drop the session.
$this->logger->warning('Could not re-read roles from refreshed access token', [
'exception' => $e,
]);
}
$this->store->put($kcSid, $session);
return $session['access_token'];